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ABSTRACT 
 
Land grabbing, investment principles and plural legal orders of 
land use 
 
Martina Locher, Bernd Steimann and Bishnu Raj Upreti 
 
Recently, foreign direct investment in land, also termed ‘land grabbing’, has 
increased significantly in developing countries. In response to growing concerns 
about its detrimental impacts, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the 
World Bank and other multilateral organizations have come forward with two 
proposals, namely the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
(FAO 2012, FAO guidelines), to protect people's rights, and the Principles for 
Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and 
Resources (FAO et al. 2010, RAI principles), to make such investments more 
responsible. One of their central tenets is that investors and host governments 
respect local people’s existing property rights over land by formalising them in a 
transparent and participatory manner. 
 
The article challenges the two proposals – and thus much of the recent land grab 
debate – from a legal pluralism perspective, by showing that they do not adequately 
consider the existence of plural legal orders over land and the dynamics of power 
and everyday practices inherent in property relations. Referring to empirical 
evidence from Tanzania, Nepal, and Kyrgyzstan, we raise three fundamental 
concerns about the formalization of property rights. First, we demonstrate that the 
recognition of customary rights is a very complex and delicate endeavour, which 
risks neglecting existing property claims and rights. Neither of the proposals 
addresses this in a satisfactory way. Second, we understand that formalization by 
state intervention is sometimes necessary, but in those circumstances we cannot 
recommend the centralist approach of formalizing property rights, as proposed in the 
RAI principles. In many contexts, this approach has resulted in adverse effects for 
local communities rather than strengthening their rights. Third, a more rights-based 
vision as brought forward by the FAO guidelines still bears the risk of reinforcing 
unequal local power structures. Yet, this vision leaves it to local communities to 
decide whether their land should become a marketable good to outsiders or not. 
However, the introduction of such a property regime requires fundamental changes 
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in governance. This cannot be addressed adequately within the framework of 
guidelines alone. Instead, more long-term strategies for the protection of customary 
rights are required. Thus, from an analytical perspective, a moratorium on ‘land 
grabs’ would be most appropriate. From a more pragmatic perspective though, we 
acknowledge the FAO guidelines and – to a much lesser extent – the RAI principles 
as more immediate efforts to reduce negative effects of 'land grabs'. However, 
investors and host governments should not mistake these guidelines as guarantors of 
ostensibly harmless land acquisitions. Finally, this article concludes that employing 
a legal pluralism perspective is very helpful in gaining a more holistic understanding 
of potential effects and proposed measures in the context of 'land grabs'. 
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LAND GRABBING, INVESTMENT 
PRINCIPLES AND PLURAL LEGAL 
ORDERS OF LAND USE1 
 
 
Martina Locher, Bernd Steimann and Bishnu Raj Upreti 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, foreign direct investment in land has increased significantly in 
developing countries. Land acquisition in a developing context by foreign investors 
is often referred to as 'land grabbing'. In response to the growing concerns about the 
effects of land grabbing, various multilateral organizations including the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank have recently come 
forward with guidelines and principles to make such investments more responsible 
and transparent. One of the central tenets in the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security (FAO 2012, in short 'FAO guidelines') and the Principles 
for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and 
Resources (FAO et al. 2010, in short 'RAI principles') is that investors and involved 
host governments recognize and respect local people's existing property rights over 
land and other natural resources. To this end, it is suggested that prior to any large-
scale land deals, existing property rights should be formalized in a transparent and 
participatory manner. Thus, the two proposals build on the assumptions that all 
kinds of property rights over land can be formalized, and that such formalization is 
required in order to support the interests of local stakeholders. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1 This article is partially based on work conducted within the framework of the 
'Special Research Project: Transnational Pressure on Land' of the Swiss National 
Centre of Competence in Research North-South (NCCR North-South): Research 
Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change. We would like to thank 
Norman Backhaus, Thomas Breu, Boniface Kiteme, Peter Messerli and Oliver 
Schönweger from the 'Malindi team', Craig Hatcher and the anonymous reviewers 
for their contributions and constructive feedbacks on the paper.  
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In this article we want to critically examine and challenge these assumptions from a 
legal pluralism perspective. Referring to the four layers of social organization 
brought forward by F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann (1999; see also F. von Benda-
Beckmann et al. 2006), we first show that the proposed guidelines and principles – 
and thus much of the recent land grab debate – do not adequately account for the 
existence of plural legal orders over land and other natural resources, and that they 
largely ignore the dynamics of power and everyday practices inherent to property 
relations. Based on this, we raise three fundamental concerns about the idea of 
formalizing property rights in a legal pluralism context, and discuss them in the light 
of empirical evidence of competing claims over land resources from Tanzania, 
Nepal, and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The article demonstrates that the identification and recognition of customary group 
or individual rights is a very complex and delicate endeavour, which entails the risk 
of neglecting existing claims and rights of local people (this is our first concern). 
Neither of the proposals addresses this in a satisfactory way. Nevertheless, there are 
cases where formalization by state intervention is necessary, namely when local 
individuals and communities2 are at risk of losing their rights against their will, or if 
it is their own wish to enter deals with outsiders. In such cases, from a legal 
pluralism perspective, a centralist approach to formalizing customary land rights as 
proposed in the RAI principles cannot be recommended. In many contexts, it has 
resulted in adverse effects for local communities rather than strengthening their 
rights (our second concern). A more "security and rights-based vision" (Assies 2009: 
586) as brought forward by the FAO guidelines still bears the risk of reinforcing 
unequal power structures within local communities (our third concern). Yet, we 
argue, this approach is more promising in terms of leaving it to local communities to 
decide whether their land and natural resources should become a marketable good to 
outsiders or not. However, the introduction of such a property regime requires broad 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2 We use the term 'local community' interchangeably with 'local people' or 'local 
stakeholders'. However, we are aware that local communities are by no means 
homogenous and do not necessarily experience the same consequences when 'land 
grabs' take place. In this article, we only distinguish between local elites and 
'common' members of local communities. Other important characteristics in the 
context of 'land grabbing' include gender (see Behrman et al. 2011) and indigeneity 
(Sawyer and Gomez 2008). For critical thoughts on the notion of 'community' 
related to natural resource management and land reforms, see Sikor and Müller 
(2009: 1310f). 
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changes in governance. This cannot be addressed satisfactorily within the 
framework of investment guidelines. Instead, more long-term strategies on how to 
protect customary rights are required. 
 
 
Foreign direct investments in land and current proposals for a 'Code of Conduct' 
 
In recent years, foreign direct investments in land have become a key factor of rural 
transformation in the Global South. Based on a new database it is estimated that 
between 2000 and April 2012, foreign land purchases and leases amounted to more 
than 80 million hectares (Anseeuw et al. 2012: 3). Deininger refers to 57.8 million 
hectares of intended or actual land deals in the year 2009 alone (Deininger 2011: 
220). So far, most of these deals have taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa, yet large 
agricultural land reserves are also at stake in post-Soviet Eurasia, Latin America and 
Asia (Visser and Spoor 2011; Borras and Franco 2010; World Bank 2010; GRAIN 
2008). Foreign investors often belong to either emerging and highly dynamic 
economies such as those of China or the Gulf states, or to developed economies 
from Europe and the US. The actual transaction of farmland usually happens in 
close collaboration with respective national governments in the host countries 
(Deininger 2011: 224; Borras and Franco 2010; GRAIN 2009). Some of the key 
drivers behind these investments are an increasing demand for food and non-food 
agro-products, such as biofuels, due to an ever-growing world population, changing 
nutrition patterns, and climate change and energy supply concerns. As a 
consequence, and in addition, land itself is also increasingly viewed as a central 
commodity and an object of speculation (Gonzalez 2010; Zoomers 2010; Cotula et 
al. 2009).  
 
Along with the increasing pace and extent of these investments or 'land grabs', a 
growing number of observers started to raise concerns about their environmental, 
economic and socio-political consequences. The main points of critique pertain to 
the detrimental effects of large-scale plantations if compared to smallholder 
agriculture. These include impacts on natural resources such as water, soils, and 
biodiversity, but also on the livelihoods of the affected population, e.g. through 
reduced food security or income opportunities (de Schutter 2011; Cotula et al. 
2009). Considerable attention has also been paid to the consequences of such 
investments for local people's property rights over land and other natural resources, 
and thus their capacity for self-determination (Borras and Franco 2010). In recent 
years, civil society organizations have documented numerous cases where local 
people's property rights were ignored and violated by investors and involved 
government agencies alike, sometimes even leading to forced displacements (see 
e.g. GRAIN 2009). Also the World Bank (2010) has reported such cases. In 
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addition, recent analyses suggest that a weak general recognition of land rights at 
country level correlates with high levels of foreign demand for that land (Alden 
Wily 2011; Deininger 2011: 218; Visser and Spoor 2011: 319f; Mann and Smaller 
2010). 
 
While certain sectors such as the extractive industry have taken up these concerns by 
agreeing on (voluntary) principles for responsible investment, no global consensus 
has been reached yet in terms of land- and water-intensive agro-investments. 
However, at the international level, two prominent proposals for such a Code of 
Conduct have been released, which have been subject to a more or less broad 
consultation process among multilateral organizations, national governments, and 
civil society organizations. 
 
A first initiative was taken by the FAO, which brought forward the "Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests 
in the Context of National Food Security" (FAO 2012). They build on the final 
declaration of the 2006 International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development, which emphasized the importance of secure and sustainable access to 
land, water and other natural resources, as well as of economic, social and cultural 
rights of marginalized and vulnerable groups in terms of land and natural resource 
issues (FAO 2006). To carry the dialogue further, the FAO initiated a broad, 
participatory process to develop practice-oriented, voluntary guidelines on the 
responsible governance of natural resource tenure. More than 90 FAO member 
countries, several UN agencies and other international organizations, farmer 
associations, representatives from the private sector as well as civil society 
organizations (CSOs) participated in the process, which consisted of three rounds of 
negotiations facilitated by a working group of the Committee on World Food 
Security (CFS). The active involvement of CSOs seems particularly noteworthy; not 
only did they participate in the official negotiations, but they additionally held a 
series of regional civil society consultations, which were facilitated by the 
International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC). Thus, the FAO's 
consultation process developed into a highly contentious debate, but in return was 
positively acknowledged by a broad range of stakeholders. In their final version 
endorsed by the CFS on May 11, 2012, the guidelines mainly address potential host 
states rather than investors. Consequently, they refer explicitly to existing binding 
international law such as the universal declaration on human rights or international 
conventions on indigenous people or biodiversity. This is also why they gained the 
support of several important international agrarian movements such as La Via 
Campesina, the IPC, and others (Borras et al. 2011). 
 
In a second initiative, the World Bank Group, the FAO, the International Fund for 
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Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) joined to propose Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (FAO et al. 2010). 
Being the result of negotiations among officials of the involved organizations rather 
than of a broad consultation process, these so-called 'RAI principles' have been 
promoted since early 2010, most prominently in the World Bank's report on land-
related investments (World Bank 2010). Their intention is to provide guidance for 
host countries and investors on how to prepare strong domestic legislation and carry 
out socially responsible investments respectively (FIAN 2010a). They consist of 
seven key principles addressing the issues of property rights, food security, 
transparency, participation, economic viability, as well as social and environmental 
sustainability. However, unlike the FAO guidelines, and despite a consultation 
process initiated in early 2010, some of the governments most directly concerned as 
well as civil society organizations have repeatedly denounced the RAI initiative for 
a striking lack of consultation in its early stages. In addition, it has been criticized 
for its reliance on the mainstream tools of 'good governance' and on corporate social 
responsibility frameworks rather than on binding human rights obligations. So far, it 
has also remained unclear as to how the RAI principles will be linked to the FAO 
guidelines (de Schutter 2011; Li 2011; FIAN 2010a). 
 
 
The Notion of 'Property Rights' in the FAO Guidelines and the RAI 
Principles from a Legal Pluralism Perspective 
 
Proponents of large-scale investments in land have often argued that they invest in 
'unused land', 'reserve agricultural land' or 'idle land' only, i.e. land which was not 
used for any form of production and for which no local claims existed whatsoever 
(World Bank 2010; Woertz et al. 2008). Critics have remarked, however, that much 
of this seemingly 'unused land', which is usually in the formal ownership of the 
state, is subject to long-standing, often vague and informal tenure rights of the local 
population, be it individuals or groups, and that the neglect of such rights may 
trigger conflict and undermine effective land use and management (Cotula et al. 
2009; Haralambous et al. 2009). Both the FAO guidelines and the RAI principles 
have taken up this concern. In principle, both proposals demand that governments 
and investors recognize and respect existing property rights to land and associated 
natural resources, namely by demarcating and formalizing these rights prior to any 
investment-related land transfer. For the detailed formulations in both proposals 
regarding the notion of property rights see Table 1. 
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Table 1: Selected main elements of the FAO guidelines and the RAI principles 
 
 FAO guidelines: Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food 
Security (FAO 2012) 
RAI principles: Principles for 
Responsible Agricultural 
Investment that Respects Rights, 
Livelihoods and Resources (FAO 
et al. 2010) 
Main 
demands 
"Where informal tenure to land, 
fisheries and forests exists, States 
should acknowledge it in a 
manner that respects existing 
formal rights under national law 
and in ways that recognize the 
reality of the situation..." (16). 
"Existing use and ownership 
rights to land, whether statutory 
or customary, primary or 
secondary, formal or informal, 
group or individual, should be 
respected." (First of the seven 
RAI principles: 2) 
 
Procedure "States should allocate tenure 
rights and delegate tenure 
governance in transparent, 
participatory ways, using simple 
procedures that are clear, 
accessible and understandable to 
all, especially to indigenous 
peoples and other communities 
with customary tenure systems" 
(13). 
 
Investors and government 
agencies must identify all right 
holders and legally recognize, 
demarcate and register their 
existing rights and uses. This is 
followed by "negotiation with 
land holders/users, based on 
informed and free choice" (2). 
 
Demarcation should be done "in 
a participatory and low-cost way 
that can be implemented quickly" 
(4). 
Manuscript submitted to Journal of Legal Pluralism for publication in Vol. 2012/65 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
?
 
- 9 – 
 
?
Objective, 
expected 
outcome 
States should "protect tenure 
right holders against the arbitrary 
loss of their tenure rights" and 
"[p]romote and facilitate the 
enjoyment of legitimate tenure 
rights" (3). 
 
Ultimately "These Voluntary 
Guidelines seek to improve 
governance of tenure of land [...] 
with the goals of food security 
[...], poverty eradication, 
sustainable livelihoods, social 
stability, housing security, rural 
development, environmental 
protection and sustainable social 
and economic development" (1). 
Recognition of land rights "can 
greatly empower local 
communities and such 
recognition should be viewed as 
a precondition for direct 
negotiation with investors" (2). 
 
Ultimately, the objective is to 
avoid "[l]oss of land and other 
resource rights to an investment 
project without recognition of 
quite valid sensitivities and 
without full compensation" and 
"...the disruption of livelihoods 
and the dislocation of 
communities" (3). Further, 
another objective seems to be to 
prevent "public criticism of 
large-scale investment" due to 
such neglects (3). 
 
Other 
comments 
"States should, in drafting tenure 
policies and laws, take into 
account the social, cultural, 
spiritual, economic and 
environmental values of land, 
fisheries and forests held under 
tenure systems of indigenous 
peoples and other communities 
with customary tenure systems" 
(15). 
Recognizing other than central 
state practices: "States should 
respect and promote customary 
approaches used by indigenous 
peoples and other communities 
with customary tenure systems to 
resolving tenure conflicts within 
communities..." (15). 
Acknowledging that the formal 
recognition of group rights may 
be difficult and may foster 
individualisation of former 
common property (3). 
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Challenging the two proposals from a legal pluralism perspective 
 
Since the consultation processes began in 2010, much criticism has been raised 
against the two proposals, not least regarding their approach to property rights. 
Many observers consider it naive to believe that legal recognition of land rights can 
guarantee their protection from 'unfriendly takeovers'. It has also been remarked that 
the simplistic focus on 'existing land rights' disregards the resource needs of future 
generations, thus underestimating new local claims that may arise in future (Borras 
and Franco 2012: 54, 2010: 517; de Schutter 2011; Li 2011; FIAN 2010a: 3; 
Scoones 2010). 
 
In addition to these legitimate points of critique, a closer look at the two proposals 
from a legal pluralism perspective raises a number of further caveats and concerns. 
These mainly pertain to their somewhat simplistic notion of 'property rights' and the 
measures proposed to strengthen and protect them. We have chosen the legal 
pluralism perspective, because we consider it particularly useful for analysing the 
complexity of land tenure in contexts where different understandings of property 
converge.3 First of all, legal pluralism accounts for the co-existence of parallel legal 
systems or institutions (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1999). This is in contrast to 
a legal centralist perspective, where "law is and should be the law of the state, (…) 
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions" (J. 
Griffiths 1986: 3). The debate on whether and how non-statutory legal systems 
should be formalized (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2005; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008; 
Assies 2009) will be taken up towards the end of this article. Second, from a legal 
pluralism perspective, engaging with property means to acknowledge that it 
encompasses more than (private or common) ownership of a resource (Wiber 1992: 
470). Instead, property rights are better understood as bundles of rights (or "web of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3 Borras and Franco claim that it would be more appropriate to focus on "rural poor 
people’s effective control" – in Ribot's and Peluso's words 'access' – instead of 
property, and thus on the question of which people have "the ability to benefit from 
things" – in this case land – by drawing on different "bundles of powers" (Borras 
and Franco 2012: 55, following Ribot and Peluso 2003: 153, 154). While we agree 
with this view to some extent, we also see some challenges related to the use of this 
concept in this context (particularly in cases where people have rights to land, but 
too little power and thus no ability to use it). We have chosen the perspective of 
legal pluralism, as we consider this framework with its broad definition of property 
as useful for analytical purposes in relation to the FAO guidelines and particularly 
the RAI principles, which focus on land (tenure) rights (not land access).  
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interests", see Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008), since different individuals or 
groups can have different rights over the same resource at the same time. The 
different types of rights can be broadly grouped into two categories, i.e. use rights 
(the rights to access and use or withdraw a resource) and control rights (the rights to 
manage a resource, to exclude others from using it, or to alienate it to others through 
sale, rental, or gift) (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001; 
J. Griffiths 1986; see Ostrom 2003 for a detailed categorization of different property 
rights). Third, legal pluralism means to acknowledge that property is not just a 
specific right or relation, but "concerns the ways in which the relations between 
society's members with respect to valuables are given form and significance" 
(Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006: 14; see also Sikor and Müller 2009: 1311; Meinzen-
Dick and Mwangi 2008: 36). Consequently, property is always seen as embedded in 
a specific social and political context, encompassing a wide variety of different 
arrangements at different levels. These can include more formal aspects such as 
written rules, less formal ones such as people's beliefs and values, but also concrete 
practices related to property (Mehta et al. 2001; Wiber 1992; A. Griffiths 1998). The 
work of Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006), who distinguish four 'layers of social 
organization', helps to analytically grasp this plurality behind property relations. The 
first layer includes ideologies and culture, where neoliberal concepts of private 
property may collide with traditional or religious concepts of common property. The 
second layer focuses on legal regulations, which are usually directly related to 
ideologies and culture, but are more specific in the sense that they define concrete 
rules and procedures. This includes state law, but also customary or religious law. 
The third layer refers to people's actual social relations related to property. These 
are often multifunctional and reflect local power relations shaped by community and 
kin or by social, political or economic dependencies (e.g. patron-client relations), 
rather than abstract norms defined by state, customary or religious law. Thus, 
disputes over land tenure can only be understood within a wider socio-political 
context (Lund 1998). The fourth layer emphasizes that it is in people's concrete, 
everyday property practices (e.g. fencing or paying land rent) where ideologies, 
laws, and social relationships regarding property are reflected, negotiated, 
reproduced, and eventually transformed. In this context, we consider 'forum 
shopping' (Meinzen-Dick 2009: 3; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001: 11; cf. K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1981) a useful concept4. It describes the practice of certain 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4 When introducing the concept termed 'forum shopping' in her work in 1981, K. 
von Benda-Beckmann described it as the practice of certain stakeholders appealing 
to different institutions (i.e. forums) representing different legal systems in order to 
solve conflicts in their favour. In this article, we use the concept in a broader sense 
for the practice of using different norms and regulations to support claims over 
resources, without necessarily appealing to conflict resolution forums. While a 
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stakeholders manoeuvring between different norms and regulations to secure their 
claims over resources. Consequently, property rights and the ways in which 
resources are used do not simply derive from statutes or formal rules, but "should be 
understood as negotiated outcomes" (Meinzen-Dick 2009: 3).  
 
To some extent, the examined guidelines and principles account for these aspects of 
legal pluralism in property rights. The FAO guidelines state explicitly that resources 
have not only an economic and a political value, but that they can also have social, 
cultural, and spiritual values (see Table 1 above). In this way, they refer at least 
indirectly to the layer of ideas and ideologies related to resource property. The RAI 
principles distinguish not only between use and ownership rights, but refer explicitly 
also to statutory and customary, primary and secondary, formal and informal, as 
well as group and individual forms of property (see Table 1). They thus 
acknowledge that property rights over resources can take multiple forms and that 
there may be other layers of legal regulation besides statutory law. Nevertheless, 
both documents still build on a rather static understanding of property, since they 
largely ignore the dynamics of concrete social relationships and property practices. 
Neither the FAO guidelines nor the RAI principles acknowledge that property 
regimes may be contested, that they may be subject to ambiguous rules, and that 
especially powerful rights holders may draw on different legal systems to legitimize 
their property claims. In short, the social embeddedness of property and related 
aspects of power are largely absent from these documents. This is particularly 
problematic because both proposals seem to assume that property rights over land 
and other natural resources can and should be formalized, and that such 
formalization necessarily supports the interests of all local stakeholders.  
 
In the following, we raise three fundamental concerns from a legal pluralism 
perspective, focusing on the identification of plural legal arrangements (our first 
concern) and the process as well as potential consequences of the proposed 
formalization (our second and third concerns). We will discuss our concerns in light 
of empirical evidence from three different regional contexts, i.e. Kyrgyzstan, 
Tanzania, and Nepal. Only part of this evidence (i.e. the evidence from Tanzania) 
stems from explicit empirical research on what is now called 'land grab'. We 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cognate term such as 'shopping for normative orders' or 'shopping for legal systems' 
would be more precise for this broader concept, we use 'forum shopping' by 
referring to Meinzen-Dick who describes it as a process in which "individuals and 
groups make use of one or another of these legal frameworks as the basis for their 
claims on a resource" (Meinzen-Dick 2009: 3; see also Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 
2001: 11). 
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intentionally use material from other contexts in which existing patterns of land 
rights have changed and resource claims of various actors compete with each other. 
We are convinced that much can be learnt about the complexity of dealing with 
multiple socio-legal arrangements in land issues and the potentials and pitfalls of 
formalization procedures also from other (and earlier) cases, as has been argued and 
demonstrated also by Hall (2011) and Li (2011: 285f). 
 
 
First Concern: Non-Statutory Legal Orders of Land Use are Difficult 
to Identify  
 
Our first concern is that the formalization of property rights is a very delicate 
endeavour. Formalization as a first step requires the identification of claims 
(Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008: 38). Claims are based on legal orders, and these 
are expressed in ideas and ideologies, concrete social relationships, and property 
practices, particularly where property rights are not (only) defined through statutory 
law. Elements in these layers of social organization are often difficult to identify and 
recognize, as we will show in the following two examples. 
 
 
Tanzania: Challenges in identifying customary property rights 
 
The example of a UK-based forestry company acquiring land in Tanzania illustrates 
challenges for outsiders to identify customary property rights during the land 
acquisition process (Locher 2011). In this case, a village assembly in the Southern 
Highlands had decided to hand over a certain area of reserve village land to the 
investor (Chachage and Baha 2010). The land is far from the core settlement and at 
present not used by the villagers. It is known under a specific name given by local 
people who had been living there before they were resettled by the socialist 
government during the 1970s. The decision was recorded in the meeting minutes 
accordingly, and a committee was formed to show the area to the district officials so 
that they would demarcate it for the land transfer. However, as Locher (2011) 
illustrates, the committee was headed by the village chairman who did not originate 
from that particular area. Since he did not know the exact boundaries of the 
respective area, he only showed it roughly to the district officials by pointing at it 
from afar. Hence, a considerably bigger area than what the village assembly had 
agreed upon was transferred, and several parcels, which according to customary law 
belonged to local households, were transferred, too. Further, some of those parcels 
were used by households from a neighbouring village, who had been provided use 
rights by the landholders. Unfortunately, the concerned households only realized 
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that their land was transferred to the investor once the deal was made. They had to 
struggle for more than a year until their claims became formally accepted. They did 
not succeed, however, to revoke the transfer and finally felt forced to agree on the 
offered compensation. The example shows that detailed knowledge about complex 
customary property rights is not shared by everyone in a village, not even 
necessarily by elected village representatives. This lack of specific knowledge is 
likely to be more pronounced in respect of secondary property rights. In such cases, 
sometimes only those directly involved know their property arrangements and exact 
boundaries. Boundaries of individual property are not visibly marked, but are both 
conveyed verbally by referring to natural landmarks and reproduced through regular 
use such as planting crops. However, some land is not used intensively and there are 
also fallow periods. This makes it particularly difficult for outsiders to physically 
detect customary property rights in short visits.  
 
 
Nepal: Dispute over ownership of a land pooling Joint Venture Project 
 
In Nepal, particularly in the capital and big cities, real estate companies have 
emerged as key players in the housing sector market. They acquire fertile 
agricultural lands from farmers at cheap rates and sell high priced houses or house 
construction sites, thus earning huge profit margins (Shrestha 2011; Upreti et al. 
2008; Upreti 2004b). In order to prevent such exploitation, the Bhaktapur 
Municipality together with the Kathmandu Valley Town Development Plan 
Executive Committee recently initiated a Joint Venture Project (JVP). In 2009, they 
accumulated approximately 30 ha of land from different landowners. The objective 
of this land pooling JVP was to improve the housing standards in the residential 
areas by providing basic requirements such as open spaces, food paths, drinking 
water, electricity, waste collection points, children's play areas. Once the land was 
endowed with all these facilities, the JVP intended to sell it for fixed prices, whereas 
the former landowners were provided right of pre-emption. However, the land soon 
became a major source of contestation among the involved stakeholders. While the 
JVP claimed full control rights (including access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion and alienation rights; see Ostrom 2003; Schlager and Ostrom 1992), the 
original land contributors argued that the JVP had no exclusive alienation rights, 
even if the project was exercising other control rights. In addition, many 
landowners, farmers, bureaucrats and politicians, who had not directly contributed 
their land to the JVP, have started to object to the JVP work by claiming different 
rights such as their freedom to use the surrounding open spaces for cultural, 
religious and social activities, which was altered after the land was taken by the 
JVP. The affected people cite their historical association, cultural and religious  
 
Manuscript submitted to Journal of Legal Pluralism for publication in Vol. 2012/65 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
?
 
- 15 – 
 
values, as well as their land use practices in order to oppose the provisions of the 
JVP.  
 
 
Conclusions from the presented cases 
 
The two cases from different contexts illustrate that 'existing property rights' over 
land resources can only be understood if conceptualized as overlapping 'bundles of 
rights'. Local claims and rights often coexist and overlap in terms of scale and time, 
and build on a broad variety of normative and cognitive frameworks as well as 
resource-related practices of access and use. Tanzanian smallholders convey their 
right to use certain land parcels from long-standing social relations and regular use 
practices, and Nepali land users interpret the rights to the JVP land according to 
their own customary and religious frameworks. Thus, local claims and rights not 
only build on different legal regulations but are also superimposed and further 
adapted by individual social relations, beliefs and practices. 
 
Consequently, local people's perceptions of 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' property 
rights often differ and even conflict with each other. The example from Tanzania 
shows that elected representatives (who are usually among the first ones to be 
involved in a participatory planning process) are not necessarily aware of all the 
flexible and often-changing tenure arrangements. In both cases, these coexisting and 
competing claims have become publicly contested in the course of an external 
intervention, such as the appearance of an investor seeking to acquire arable land in 
Tanzania and the municipality authorities acquiring land for a housing improvement 
project in Nepal. Apparently, both interventions have failed to sufficiently account 
for existing claims and rights, even when they tried to do so in a participatory 
manner (as in Tanzania) or sought to make access to land resources more equal (as 
in Nepal). This raises the question, whether and how locally existing claims and 
rights can be 'recognized' in the course of a large-scale investment in land. The 
complex endeavour is even more delicate for investors that usually deal with formal 
authorities who often themselves do not know or recognize the plural legal 
arrangements at the local level.  
 
In any case, trying to identify existing rights by adopting a 'quick' and 'simple' 
procedure (as suggested in the two proposals) seems not only unrealistic but also 
irresponsible, given the conflicts and displacements that this may cause. We will 
take up this thought again towards the end of this article.  
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Second Concern: Centralist Approaches to Formalizing Property 
Rights Allow the State Administration to Expand its Influence at the 
Cost of Local Communities 
 
Our second concern is that the formalization of hitherto non-formalized property 
rights allows superior levels of the state administration to expand their influence and 
increase their control over subordinate levels of the administration as well as over 
local communities and individual resource users. While this is not negative per se, 
under certain circumstances it can result in adverse political and financial pressure 
upon local communities and resource users. Thus, land titling may run counter to the 
declared intention of the FAO guidelines and the RAI principles to strengthen local 
communities and to ensure the effective use of scarce natural resources. 
 
 
Nepal: Formalization and legalization of property rights as a means to expand state 
influence and control 
 
Until 1950, land rights in Nepal were shaped by various cultural, social and 
normative practices and plural legal arrangements such as state, folk, customary, 
indigenous, and religious law (Upreti 2004a). In 1951, Nepal started a land reform 
to formalize and legalize property rights, which has been a major agenda for six 
decades. In the course of the reform the state changed all existing forms of land 
ownership into the Raikar ownership system. Raikar denotes an ultimate state 
ownership over all land, which is then cultivated by individuals as direct tenants of 
the state. The reform thus did away with six existing different forms of land control 
rights (Pyakuryal and Upreti 2011; Alden Wily et al. 2009; Caplan 2000; Thapa 
2000; Regmi 1999). Studies show that at the operational level such expansion of 
state control and influence created numerous complications and led to many local 
conflicts (Upreti 2010; Upreti et al. 2008). The government argued though, that it 
was necessary to merge all land tenure systems in the country into one form of 
ownership in order to reach the declared objectives of improving land management, 
increasing agricultural production and productivity, and ensuring access to land for 
the landless (Kshetry 2011; Shrestha 2011). However, the reform provided a 
conducive (and to some extent manipulative) framework for a close nexus between 
the bureaucracy of government land administration and powerful elites to reap the 
benefits of the reform (Pyakuryal and Upreti 2011; Alden Wily et al. 2009). Basnet 
documents that when the land reform was implemented through the Lands Act 1964, 
the poorest 65 percent of the total population held 15 percent of land as opposed to 
3.7 percent of the population, the rich peasants and feudal lords, who held 39.7 
percent of land (Basnet 2011: 143). After the reform, according to the UNDP 
Manuscript submitted to Journal of Legal Pluralism for publication in Vol. 2012/65 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
?
 
- 17 – 
 
(2004), the 5 wealthiest percent of the people in Nepal own 37 percent of all arable 
land, whereas the poorest 47 percent own only 15 percent of all land. Though these 
figures show a gradual improvement over time they also demonstrate that the poor, 
marginalized and landless were not among the main beneficiaries of the most hyped 
land reform programme in Nepal. However, government officials not only gained 
control over land resources, but greatly expanded their influence over local 
communities. By using their authority, connection and influences, political and 
bureaucratic elites manipulated the provisions of the different land-related acts and 
regulations in order to exploit local people. This has also created problems in food 
production and security (Ghale 2011; Upreti et al. 2008), as it altered the existing 
agricultural practice, moving away from food production to non-agricultural 
commercial activities, and consequently food insecurity became more prevalent 
(Khatri and Upreti 2012).    
 
 
Kyrgyzstan: Private arable land as a liability for the less wealthy 
 
Agrarian reforms in Kyrgyzstan gained momentum in late 1993, when in view of the 
rapid impoverishment of the rural population, the central government declared the 
de-collectivization of former collective and state farms compulsory. Consequently, 
most of the hitherto state-owned arable land within these farms had to be equally 
distributed on an individual basis to all current and former farm employees and their 
family members. The land was first distributed in the form of land-use rights, which 
were converted into private ownership rights in 1998. However today, less wealthy 
households are often unable to cultivate all the land they received (Steimann 2011). 
They either lack the financial and technical means or the skills and knowledge 
required to do so. In addition, many irrigation schemes are in bad shape, and the 
allocation of water by local committees is often subject to arbitrariness and 
corruption (Lindberg 2007). At the same time, selling land is difficult because the 
concerned plots are usually far from the village and of bad quality; further, a 
nationwide moratorium on land sales was not lifted before 2001, this seriously 
slowed down the emergence of a functioning land market in rural Kyrgyzstan. 
Returning the land to the state is also not possible. As a consequence, a great deal of 
arable land has fallen out of production in recent years (Mamytova and 
Mambetalieva 2008). Nonetheless, irrespective of whether rural households use all 
their arable land or not, they are obliged to pay land taxes to the communal 
authorities. In addition, arable land serves as a basis for assessing a household's 
entitlement to state child allowances. This means that rural Kyrgyz households are 
taxed and assessed on the basis of land assets that many of them can neither use nor 
sell. In this way, private land ownership has turned into a liability for many among 
the less wealthy. At the same time, it has given the state an opportunity to exert 
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pressure upon the local population. For instance, communal authorities use the threat 
of tax increases as an effective means to get their way in the course of local conflicts 
(Steimann 2011: 182). 
 
 
Conclusions from the presented cases 
 
The two examples may illustrate very different processes, yet they both show how 
legal centralist approaches, which define statutory law as the main or only normative 
framework (J. Griffiths 1986), inevitably lead to the expansion of power of the state 
administration. In many cases, this happens at the expense of local communities and 
resource users. Political elites in Nepal capitalize on the land reform by adjusting 
certain provisions of the new land acts and regulations to expand their influence and 
power at the local level. The Kyrgyz state endowed rural people with private 
property over land but not the means and structures required to effectively use it; 
since land is subject to taxes it has become a liability for many. 
 
This raises considerable doubts as to whether a centralist approach can really do 
justice to legal plural orders over land property. It seems instead that the statutory 
recognition (or redefinition) of existing claims and rights strengthens the state 
administration rather than local communities. This confirms again that property is 
not just about questions of legal regulation and economic efficiency, but is always 
embedded in a concrete social and political context and is thus closely linked to 
issues of power and domination. In other words and with reference to the four layers 
of social organization of Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006), by enforcing statutory law 
as the dominant or only normative framework, the state gains authority over the 
layer of ideologies and culture and the layer of legal regulations. Hence, it 
automatically gains considerable control over the layers of social relations and 
people's property practices and thus over local patterns of power and domination.  
 
 
Third Concern: Formalizing Property Rights Bears the Risk of 
Reinforcing Unequal Local Power Structures 
 
Our third concern is that even if the central state introduces formalized property 
rights with the best intentions, it still runs the risk of reinforcing unequal local power 
structures. The implementation and maintenance of a respective regime and thus the 
expansion of state authority to the local level in a way that supports local people is 
complex and often beyond the state's capacity. The new legal provisions may be 
difficult to understand and become commingled with previous property regimes, 
thus providing ground for contestation. In such situations, local elites may benefit 
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much more from formalization procedures than the poor. Since property regimes are 
always embedded in networks of dominance and dependence, local elites are usually 
in a better position than the less wealthy and less powerful to get their existing 
claims recognized, or to defend them towards external actors. To a large extent, this 
is to do with the practice of 'forum shopping' (see text and footnote on page 9), 
which allows especially wealthier and well informed people to manoeuvre between 
various normative and cognitive orders to defend their claims over resources. 
 
 
Kyrgyzstan: Privatization of arable land and redefinition of pasture use rights 
 
In rural Kyrgyzstan, the rapid privatization of state-owned farmland contributed to 
the reproduction of existing disparities between rural elites and ordinary workers 
(Steimann 2012). In most cases, the distribution of land and other farm assets was 
carried out by a local commission consisting of former farm leaders, agronomists, 
local elders, and other well-respected people. Building on two case studies from 
Central Kyrgyzstan, Steimann shows that the result was often a land distribution that 
was equal in a quantitative, but not in a qualitative sense (Steimann 2011). In fact, 
many among the local elite managed to secure undivided land parcels close to their 
own house, while less well informed people – mostly ordinary farm workers and 
their family members – often received their land share in the form of several divided 
parcels. Since these were usually far from the village and difficult to access and 
irrigate, this has seriously hampered people's ability to benefit from their land in the 
long run. The same study shows how new claims to farmland emerged once the 
official privatization procedure was over. In view of their ever-increasing flocks, 
wealthier local households were soon in need of additional arable land for the 
production of sufficient winter forage. To this end, many of them have begun to 
irrigate and cultivate land from a communal land fund. They claim rights to these 
areas based on arrangements during the Soviet times, yet they use the land without 
the consent of the communal authorities in charge of the fund and thus without 
paying any use fees. Such illicit appropriation has become possible because 
communal control over this land has always been very weak. However, in cases 
where the local authorities detected such practice, the concerned households usually 
formalize their claim ex post by concluding a lease contract. Wealthy rural 
households thus make use of their possibilities of 'forum shopping' – i.e. 
manoeuvring between non-formal appropriation (based on an earlier normative 
order) and formal recognition – to secure their private claims over land resources. 
Bichsel et al. emphasize that the new Kyrgyz land property regime thus continues to 
be conditioned by its preceding regime and by related social relations and local 
power disparities – irrespective of a seemingly clear allocation and legal recognition  
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of private and common property rights over land and other natural resources 
(Bichsel et al. 2010: 264f). 
 
Another example of the central state's incapacity to fully implement formalized land 
rights is the case of the Kyrgyz pastures. Unlike arable land or livestock, pastures 
were not privatized after the Soviet collapse, but remained in the ownership of the 
state. In the late 1990s, a legal framework for pasture use and management was put 
in place, which allowed individuals and groups to lease pastures from the state. 
However, the law left many loopholes, and the state authorities were neither able nor 
willing to enforce it. The result is that pastures have remained highly contested 
between different actors at various levels (Steimann 2011). At the local level, 
households have repeatedly secured their access to pastures either by abiding by 
state law (i.e. conclusion of a formal lease contract), or by negating it. In the latter 
case, this mainly happened with reference to individual customary use rights 
(usually based on pasture use practices from Soviet times), or by insistence on often-
vague notions of pastures as a common pool resource. This coexistence of norms 
and claims has repeatedly led to conflicts when leaseholders tried to bar non-
leaseholders from using 'their' pastures. Again, in the course of these conflicts, the 
wealthier leaseholders are usually in a better position than their less wealthy 
competitors due to their ability to practice 'forum shopping'. 
 
 
Tanzania: Knowledge and power differences in defending and registering customary 
land rights 
 
The Tanzanian land law (URT 1999a, 1999b) is praised for respecting customary 
rights and providing management responsibility over rural areas to village bodies 
(Knight 2010; Alden Wily 2003). Evidence from two case studies, based on 
qualitative interviews conducted by Locher shows, however, that the law is complex 
and difficult to understand for many among the local population and even for 
government officials. It is thus a challenging task for district officials to teach the 
often-illiterate local population the necessary knowledge on defending and 
registering non-formal rights. Village leaders – who are usually more educated and 
have more regular contacts with district officials and better access to the relevant 
legal documents – often have a lead over other villagers in terms of relevant 
knowledge and may be able to take advantage of that situation. The formalization of 
land property also requires registration at village and district level and includes 
certain costs for landholders. Thus, it might be less accessible for poor people 
(personal communication by Locher 2011; see also Knight 2010; Pedersen 2010; 
Odgaard 2006). Also when it comes to defending customary rights, local elites are 
often in a better position than other villagers, as one example related to the above 
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mentioned case in the Tanzanian Southern Highlands (see first concern) shows: 
When district officials by mistake were in the process of demarcating an area which 
was used by several villagers under customary law, a well situated businessman, 
who has considerable knowledge about the statutory land law, stopped the officials 
from surveying his plot. Realising that the village council was the proper authority 
to impede the demarcation process, he managed to get support from council 
members (personal communication by Locher 2011). At the same time, other 
villagers failed to defend their customary rights and lost them to the investor against 
their will (Locher 2011). 
 
 
Conclusions from the presented cases 
 
The cases from Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania show that the redefinition of land 
ownership or use rights by the state may create situations in which legal provisions 
are unclear or not implemented strictly (for Tanzania see also Pedersen 2010, 2011). 
The presented examples show that in such situations, even under very different 
circumstances, local elites often benefit disproportionately from land titling 
processes. They either build on good connections with state representatives, use 
their economic potential to practice 'forum shopping', or benefit from the fact that 
they are more knowledgeable in terms of rules and procedures than other people. 
That way, former Soviet elites directed the Kyrgyz land privatization according to 
their own needs, wealthier Kyrgyz households refer to either statutory or customary 
law to claim access to communal land and pastures, and Tanzanian village leaders 
can register their land rights easier than poor or vulnerable groups. Also during the 
land reform in Nepal (see our second concern), a similar process was observed. 
Local elites who had access to the state power centres and privileges managed to 
leverage the land-related state structures, institutions, acts and regulations. Thus, 
despite the declared objective of a more equitable land distribution, mostly large 
landowners (who frequently control more land than the legal maximum) have 
benefited from the land reform, while the poor, marginalized and lower sections of 
society were often badly affected (Kshetry 2011; Pyakuryal and Upreti 2011; Alden 
Wily et al. 2009; Upreti et al. 2008). All this again illustrates how strongly social 
power relations determine property regimes. As Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan point 
out, property rights "are only as strong as the institutions or collectivity that stands 
behind them" (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001: 11). Consequently, socioeconomic 
disparities and the resulting power relations have a considerable influence on what 
people can or cannot do to claim and secure property rights over resources. This 
becomes particularly problematic in the case of secondary use rights of landless 
people, who are often unable to secure their already weak claims in the course of a 
land titling process (see also FIAN 2010b: 3). The evidence presented here also 
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suggests that even well intended participatory processes can hardly avoid being 
strongly influenced or captured by local elites. 
 
 
Discussion  
 
Already before the recent rise of foreign direct investments in land, there has been 
much debate on the use of formalizing poor people's property rights over land and 
other resources as a means to reduce poverty. In reaction to the wave of neoliberal 
(land) reforms in the wake of the Washington Consensus, land titling was promoted 
as the 'silver bullet' for the poor (de Soto 2003). Yet, critics have repeatedly 
remarked that formalized property rights are no guarantee that poor people can 
actually access and cultivate land, or can derive any other benefit from it, e.g. 
through land markets (Borras and Franco 2010; Sikor and Müller 2009: 1309; 
Cotula et al. 2006; Fitzpatrick 2005). Assies shows for instance that the expectation 
that formal land titles facilitate access to credit often does not hold true in practice, 
either because banks are not interested in the provision of small loans to poor 
people, or because smallholders fear using their land as mortgage security (Assies 
2009: 582). 
Besides the debate on the use of land titling, there is also some debate on different 
ways of formalizing customary rights and the related overall objectives. Focusing on 
the formalization of existing property rights over land and other resources as 
suggested by the FAO guidelines and the RAI principles we have raised three 
concerns by arguing from a legal pluralism perspective and building on evidence 
from Kyrgyzstan, Nepal and Tanzania. In the following, we discuss our concerns in 
light of the existing debate.  
 
 
Centralist approaches to formalization of existing tenure rights 
 
Assies shows that in principle, the whole formalization debate has evolved around 
two contrasting objectives or visions (Assies 2009: 574f, referring to Payne 2000), 
he names them legal centralist, "marketability-based vision" (where formalization 
mainly serves to turn land into a marketable good), and "security and rights-based 
vision" (which aims at strengthening local people's rights and self-determination). 
According to John Griffiths, notions such as 'recognition' or 'formalization' of 
existing rights are typical reflections of a legal centralist approach, because they 
imply that customary laws must ultimately be recognized by a single validating 
source, i.e. statutory law (J. Griffiths 1986: 8). Such an approach is suggested by the 
RAI principles. However, a centralist or 'state-led' land reform does not only have 
important limitations in achieving its targets (Sikor and Müller 2009) but – as we 
Manuscript submitted to Journal of Legal Pluralism for publication in Vol. 2012/65 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
?
 
- 23 – 
 
argue in our second concern – it also inevitably strengthens the state administration 
at the expense of local communities and individuals. While this is not negative per 
se, our examples have shown how involved state representatives can leverage their 
position in a formalization procedure to lead reforms astray. Whereas the RAI 
principles largely ignore this apparent problem, the FAO guidelines propose a series 
of measures that states can take to recognize property rights in a fair and transparent 
manner. They thus rather suggest an orientation towards a security and rights-based 
vision. 
 
 
Approaches that recognize pluralism and their implementation challenge 
 
The FAO guidelines propose that: "States should consider adapting their policy, 
legal and organizational frameworks to recognize tenure systems of indigenous 
peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems" (FAO 2012:14). 
They are thus in line with what Assies suggests for the implementation of a security 
and rights-based vision (Assies 2009: 586). Assies proposes to 're-institutionalize' 
existing property regimes wherever possible, i.e. to allow for an overall legal 
recognition of plural customary tenure regimes, rather than to forcefully subject 
them to a single, national property system under statutory law (Assies 2009: 586, 
referring to Bruce 1998). This approach "does not prescribe a specific approach to 
land reform" but is based on pluralism (Toulmin and Quan 2000: 5, cited in Ubink 
2009: 9). An approach that "accommodate[s] the complexity of rights and practices 
at multiple levels, including especially the local level" (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 
2008: 43) may also allow recognizing overlapping bundles of rights or protecting 
existing common property rights from the risk of being privatized in the course of a 
formalization procedure.5 We conclude that formalization of land tenure needs to be 
anchored at the local level. The example of Tanzania, whose Village Land Act of 
2001 provides customary rights – be they registered or not – the same legal status as 
statutory rights under the Land Act 2001, is an attempt in that direction. However, 
the implementation of such types of land reforms faces its own challenges (Sikor 
and Müller 2009; for Tanzania see Pedersen 2010, 2011). First, there is often a lack 
of commitment on different state levels to fully implement respective laws and 
allocate the necessary means to the local level (Knight 2010: 258). After all, letting 
others participate in the formalization of property rights means sharing power over 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
5 On the complexity of formal recognition of group rights in general see Alden Wily 
2006 and Fitzpatrick 2005, and for Nepal see Alden Wily et al. 2009 and Upreti et 
al. 2008.   
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resources.6 Knight thus concludes that if a reform is not to "face a kind of subtle 
bureaucratic mutiny" (Knight 2010: 259), it requires broad changes in governance: 
"state officials need new powers, roles and responsibilities if a new law strips them 
of their previously-held authority" (Knight 2010: 258).  
 
Second, as we have demonstrated in our examples related to the third concern, and 
as Wiber states: "The consequences of the introduction of state law into minority 
regions are not, however, always those planned by state bureaucrats" (Wiber 1992: 
487). Formalization processes can be very complex endeavours, which may kindle 
latent conflicts (Assies 2009: 584; see also Cotula et al. 2006: 20). Hence, they 
require, besides political will, considerable capacities on the part of the involved 
state authorities – capacities lacking in many of the countries affected by large-scale 
foreign investments in land (see also Li 2011; Pedersen 2011). As a consequence, 
local elites outside the state institutions or certain skilful groups often benefit 
disproportionately from land titling processes, while claims and rights of the less 
wealthy and powerful are infringed upon (see also Ubink 2009; Meinzen-Dick and 
Mwangi 2008; Sawyer and Gomez 2008; Cotula et al. 2006). Since wealth and 
power disparities are essential constituents of property regimes, even participatory 
approaches cannot always avoid 'elite capture' or other types of struggles within 
local communities. Thus, even a clear political will for 're-institutionalization' 
cannot ensure that all people get treated in a fair manner.  
 
 
Avoid legal intervention whenever possible 
 
Due to the outlined challenges, Fitzpatrick suggests that the extent of external legal 
intervention in customary land systems "should be determined by reference to the 
nature and causes of any tenure insecurity" and intervention should be avoided 
whenever possible (Fitzpatrick 2005: 449). This means that in those cases where 
customary property regimes have worked considerably well so far and where local 
individuals and communities show no interest in selling their rights to outsiders, the 
state's role should be limited to recognising existing customary rights as a whole and 
protecting them against external threats. Thus, existing claims and rights would 
remain embedded in a given social context and not be incorporated into the 
mainstream market system. Land would thus remain out of reach for investors. This 
is much in line with the demands of global farmer organizations such as La Via 
Campesina who have been fighting for an overall recognition of customary property 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6 For a conceptual analysis of the reciprocal constitution of property and authority 
see Sikor and Lund 2009.  
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regimes beyond statutory law since the 1990s (La Via Campesina 2011). It is 
certainly not in line, however, with the intentions of the RAI principles, which – 
even more than the FAO guidelines – emphasize the ostensible advantages of land 
as a marketable good. 
 
 
The complexities of participatory land titling 
 
Nevertheless, there may be justified needs for state interventions at the local level. 
Customary property regimes may fail to de-escalate local resource conflicts, or – 
more essential in the context of foreign investments – communities may explicitly 
wish to create marketability for their land resources. In these situations, Fitzpatrick 
recommends certain forms of state regulation. However, he also warns of "quick-fix 
attempts to impose formalized titles on fluid customary interests" (Fitzpatrick 2005: 
472). In such cases, participatory approaches are a must. Yet, as we argue in our first 
concern and unlike suggestions by the FAO guidelines and the RAI principles, these 
can neither be 'simple' nor 'quick'. Identifying customary property rights is a delicate 
endeavour, because it usually concerns overlapping bundles of rights, which are 
embedded in a social and political context and constantly reproduced through 
people's relations and everyday practices. Our example from Tanzania shows that 
even elected village leaders are not always aware of all existing claims and 
(secondary) rights. Yet if common knowledge regarding detailed property rights is 
absent within a community, it can take a lot of time and money to identify different 
groups of stakeholders, to understand local patterns of domination and dependency, 
and to carefully select adequate representatives. In cases where certain land rights 
are held by external actors (e.g. in the form of patron-client relations), participation 
may even need to be scaled up beyond the local level. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
When analyzing potential economic and socio-political effects and proposed 
measures in the context of 'land grabs' it is crucial to gain a holistic understanding of 
land tenure systems. This article concludes that employing a legal pluralism 
perspective is very helpful in this regard. Adapting this perspective and using also 
empirical cases beside the classical examples of 'land grabbing', we have 
demonstrated that the identification and recognition of customary property rights 
over land is a very complex and delicate endeavour, which risks neglecting locally 
existing property claims and rights. Unfortunately, neither the RAI principles nor the 
FAO guidelines address this challenge in a satisfactory way. First, both initiatives 
propose to identify existing rights in a participatory manner, an approach that is 
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certainly indispensable yet anything but 'quick' and 'simple'. Second, the centralist 
approach to land tenure in the RAI principles does not allow acknowledging legal 
plural orders and the social embeddedness of local property regimes. Third, even a 
more security and rights-based vision as brought forward by the FAO guidelines 
entails the risk of elite capture and of reinforcing unequal power structures within 
local communities. To some extent, however, it allows for the incorporation of land-
related cultural, social and normative practices and of plural legal arrangements and 
thus for the protection of locally existing tenure rights. It further leaves it to local 
communities to decide whether their land and natural resources should become a 
marketable good to outsiders or not. However, in many countries the realization of 
this vision would require the adaptation of whole legal regimes and national 
regulations which takes, besides political will, a lot of time for implementation and 
involves fundamental changes in governance. Further, careful participatory land use 
planning at the local level could prove to be an additional tool to reduce negative 
effects of foreign land acquisitions. Completed before any external interests arise, it 
serves as a basis for local communities to take decisions regarding the availability of 
land for potential investors. However, the introduction of meaningful nationwide 
land use planning is a major endeavour. All of these challenges cannot be addressed 
adequately and convincingly within the framework of such guidelines alone. 
Instead, more long-term strategies for the protection of customary rights are 
required. Thus, from an analytical perspective, a moratorium on 'land grabs' as 
postulated by some civil society organizations (IPC 2011) would be most 
appropriate. From a more pragmatic perspective though, we acknowledge the FAO 
guidelines and – to a much lesser extent – the RAI principles as more immediate 
efforts to reduce negative effects of 'land grabs'. However, investors and host 
governments should by no means mistake these guidelines as guarantors of 
ostensibly harmless land acquisitions, as the complexity of plural land orders cannot 
be underestimated. Even when following the guidelines the risk of infringing upon 
local people's land rights continues to be very high. 
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